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The Indian Constitution with its mandate of equality (Art.14), non-
discrimination on the basis of sex (Art.15) positive discrimination in favor of 
women (or affirmative action) (Art.15(3)) equality and non-discrimination in 
employment and service conditions (Art.16), right to life and liberty (Art.21) 
is an important instrument for the protection of women in India. Although 
certain protective legislation was enacted in the first thirty years after the 
Constitution came into being, it is only during the last three decades that 
women’s concerns were highlighted in the official discourse and in the public 
domain.  One major contributory factor towards this change has been the 
Report of the Status of Committee for Women brought out in 1974 as the 
background country paper for the forthcoming United Nations Conference in 
1975 – the International Year of the Women.  
 
Ratification of International Conventions such as the Convention for 
the Elimination of All forms of Violence Against Women (CEDAW) by the 
Indian State in 1993 has been yet another contributor factor which has led to 
some land mark judgments.  These include the Vishaka Guidelines, which 
amounted to judicial law making in aid of women.  
 
The Indian Women’s Movement initiated in the late 1970s has been 
yet another contributory factor and has served to bring issues of violence 
against women out of its closeted existence and into the public domain. As a 
result of this intervention, issues such as rape and dowry became concerns 
both for the lawmakers as well as for the judiciary. The catalyst for the 
campaign was the Supreme Court judgment in the Mathura rape case. 
(Tukaram v State of Maharashtra AIR 1979 SC 185)  Mathura, a 16 year old, 
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illiterate, orphan, tribal girl was raped by two policemen while they were on 
duty.  The rape took place within the vicinity of the police station.  But since 
the young girl had eloped with her boyfriend and was brought to the police 
station due to a complaint filed by her brother, she was viewed as a woman of 
loose moral character.  Since there were no marks of injury, the court termed 
Mathura a liar. Her evidence regarding the rape was disbelieved.  The 
Supreme Court overruled the Bombay High Court decision and acquitted the 
policemen.  
 
The result of the public campaigns initiated by women’s 
organizations was legislative reforms which received a prompt reply from the 
state. If oppression was to be tackled by enacting laws, then the decade of the 
Eighties could easily be declared as the golden era for Indian women, when 
pro-women laws were given on a platter. During this period every single issue 
concerning violence against women taken up by the women's movement was 
transformed into legislative reform.   The enactments conveyed a positive 
picture of achievement, but the statistics revealed a dismal story.  Each year 
the number of reported cases of rapes and unnatural deaths of married women 
increased. The rate of convictions under the new and laudable legislation was 
dismal.  Hence their deterrent value was never realized.   
 
The salient features of the 1983 amendments were that in selective 
cases of custodial rapes (such as in police lockups, prisons, hospitals, rescue 
homes, remand homes, and so on), the burden of proving consent, once the 
sexual intercourse was proved, shifted to the accused.   Further, a minimum 
mandatory punishment was imposed: seven years for ordinary rape and ten 
years for rape of an aggravated nature, such as gang rapes, custodial rapes, 
rape of children under the age of 12 years, and rape of pregnant women.  The 
amendments also introduced a new offence and made consensual sexual 
intercourse in certain custodial situations punishable.  
 
In the following years, sexual assault continued to dominate public 
discourse as the country witnessed a steady increase in reported cases. The 
National Crime Record Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, in its annual 
publication titled, Crime in India, provided the following official statistics of 
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1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 
Number of 
Reported cases  
9518 12351 13754 14846 15330 15031 16496 
 
During the period between 1990 and 1998, the Bureau reported an 
increase of 92.5% in crimes against women in the country.  There was an 
alarming increase of over 65% in reported cases of rapes within a decade from 
1988 to 1998 according to the same source.  Even more alarming is the fact 
that these figures reflect only the tip of the iceberg as a large number of cases 
still remain unreported due to the stigma attached to the crime. 
 
Despite the positive stipulations, most cases ended in acquittals and 
rape trials continued to be traumatic for the victim.  The relevance of the 
victim’s moral character and sexual history was a contentious point. Despite 
the demand from the women’s movement for its deletion, the stipulation that a 
victim’s past sexual history can be used as a defense for the accused was 
retained.  This continued to provide the scope for the defense lawyers to 
humiliate the victim.  Through shaming the victim in a packed courtroom 
through crude and vulgar cross-examination, a criminal lawyer could display 
his legal acumen and obtain an acquittal for his client, or so it seemed.  
 
In the context of rape, the two most prevalent social myths which 
often translate into dominant legal discourse are that when a woman says no, 
she really means yes, and that women who are jilted by their lovers frequently 
accuse their former boyfriends of rape.  The anti-rape campaign subscribed to 
the traditional notion of rape as the ultimate violation of a woman and a fate 
worse than death.  Marital rape, non-penetrative sexual abuse and other forms 
of sexual assault remained outside of its ambit.   
 
The enactment focused on stringent punishment rather than plugging 
procedural loopholes, evolving guidelines for strict implementation, adequate 
compensation to the victims and timely trials.  The concern of legal experts 
both within and outside the women's movement that stricter punishment 
would lead to fewer convictions proved to be well founded.  Each law vested 
more power in the state enforcement machinery.  Each enactment stipulated 
more stringent punishment for convictions.  This paradigm is contrary to a 
progressive legal reform theory of leniency to the accused.  Can progressive 
legal changes for women's rights exist in a vacuum, in direct contrast to other 
progressive legal theories of civil rights?  So long as basic attitudes of the 
268 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION [Vol. 36.2 
 
 
powers-that-be remain anti-women, anti-minority and anti-poor, to what 
extent can these laws bring about social justice?  At best they can be an 
eyewash and a way of evading more basic issues of patriarchal power 
structures, and at worse they can be a weapon of state co-option and 
manipulation to further its own ends. 
 
The rape campaign is a classic example of the impact of public 
pressure on the judiciary.  Favorable judgments were delivered before the 
amendment when the campaign was at its peak as compared to the post-
amendment period.  In 1980, Justice Krishna declared, “The court must bear 
in mind human psychology and behavioral probability when assessing the 
credibility of the victim's version.” Voicing his apprehensions regarding the 
demand for stringent punishment, he warned, “a socially sensitized judge is a 
better statutory armor against gender outrage than long clauses of a complex 
section with all the protections writ into it.” The judicial trends of the post-
amendment period tend to substantiate his prophetic predictions.  But 
periodically, the Supreme Court and the High Courts laid down procedural 
norms and issued strictures against a lax and corrupt investigative machinery 
and a gender biased lower judiciary for their hostile attitude and suspicious 
approach towards a rape victim.  
 
A similar situation also prevails when examining the legislation from 
the eighties regarding “dowry harassment” and “dowry death.”  While 
domestic violence has always haunted the women’s movement and was one of 
its important rallying points, the analysis which linked domestic violence to 
dowry rendered the amendments to the Indian Penal Code ineffective.   
 
The term “dowry death” artificially linked “dowry” which is related 
to property, to “death,” which in this context is a criminal act of violence. The 
complexities of the two separate issues, domestic violence and women's rights 
over and access to property, were not sufficiently deciphered. The legal 
reforms did not take into account the vulnerability of a girl not only in her 
marital home, but also in her natal family.  
 
In each case of cruelty, suicide or murder, the prosecution had to 
prove not only a link, but a close proximity to the dowry demand and the 
incident of violence as the offences under the IPC were framed in the 
language of “dowry,” that is, dowry death  (S.304B), cruelty to wives and 
dowry harassment (S.498A), and so on.  If this could not be done, the blame 
was placed squarely on the victim and she was branded a liar.   
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In this context, the recently enacted Domestic Violence (Prevention) 
Act (DVA) has placed the issue of violence against women within a socio-
legal framework. The benefit of the enactment is that it sets free the 
movement from the malaise that has plagued it for a long time: that of 
attributing all categories of violence suffered by women within their families 
to “dowry,” and widening the scope of the term “domestic violence.”  It 
acknowledges that domestic violence is a widely prevalent and universal 
problem of power relationships; it is much more than the culture-specific 
phenomenon called “dowry death.”  And more importantly, it marks a 
departure from the penal provisions which hinged on stringent punishments to 
focus on the more positive civil rights of protection and injunction.  
 
The victims/survivors are now able to access the legal system without 
having to plead “dowry linked” harassment.  The Act provides the scope for 
protective injunctions against violence, dispossession from the matrimonial 
home and alternate residence.  It also provides the scope for claiming 
economic protection, including maintenance.  The wide definition of domestic 
violence – physical, mental, economical and sexual - brings under its purview 
the invisible violence suffered by a large section of women and entitles them 
to claim protection from the courts.    
 
Examining the Act from another angle, I find the single most 
significant achievement of the enactment is the widening of the scope of 
protection against violence beyond the category of “wives” and extending it 
not only to mothers, daughters and sisters, but even to women in informal 
relationships.  Aged women, unmarried girls and widowed or divorced sisters 
can now seek protection from their relatives under this Act.   
 
Further, an entire gamut of women, whose marriages are suspect due 
to some “legal defect” on the ground that essential ceremonies were not 
performed or that the man or the woman has an earlier existing marriage will 
be able to seek reliefs under this Act.  The invalidity of a marriage can no 
longer be used as defense by the man to dispossess or deny maintenance to 
this vulnerable group of women.    
 
How this Act will unfold in the courtrooms and whether it will open 
up floodgates of “sexual promiscuity” charges or whether it will redeem 
Hindu marriages from the burdensome yoke of monogamy is yet to be seen.  
But for any matrimonial lawyer concerned with rights for women – whether 
they are wives, maidens or concubines – the Act opens up new portals of 
hope.   
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Hopefully it will also serve to challenge the sexual Puritanism that we find 
evident in our courts today.  How a section of the women’s movement, with 
an equally puritanical mindset that has hinged most of its campaigns upon the 
politicized concept of “Hindu monogamy” will be able to negotiate this Act in 
days to come is an even more daunting question.  The problem will arise 
when the right of residence of a legally married wife clashes with the right of 
a so-called “immoral and promiscuous” one.  And this will be the moment 
when we will be forced to confront our own notions of sexual morality.
